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DEHN v. EDGECOMBE: 
Absent the Doctor-Patient Relationship, a Patient's Spouse Does Not 
Possess an Independent Medical Malpractice Cause of Action 
By: Mark Patrick Johnson 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that absent a doctor-
patient relationship, a patient's spouse does not possess an independent 
medical malpractice cause of action. Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. 
606, 865 A.2d 603 (2005). In so holding, the court affirmed the trial 
court's dismissal of a medical malpractice claim. 
Corinne and James Dehn ("Dehns") decided not to have any 
more children in 1994. Mr. Dehn discussed a vasectomy with his 
family physician, Dr. Glenn Edgecombe ("Dr. Edgecombe"). Dr. 
Edgecombe referred the Dehns to Dr. Mazella, who performed the 
vasectomy in October 1995. During the post-operative phase, Dr. 
Mazella warned Mr. Dehn about the procedure's effectiveness, 
instructing him, among other things, to have three semen analyses 
conducted during the six months post-operation. 
Mr. Dehn did not obey the post-operative care instructions; 
notably, he failed to follow the prescriptions for semen analysis. Mr. 
Dehn visited Dr. Edgecombe on unrelated matters on at least one 
occasion after the operation, and mentioned semen analysis. Dr. 
Edgecombe snubbed Mr. Dehn, stating that although semen analysis 
was appropriate, Mr. Dehn did not need to have one performed. 
Subsequently, in 1996, the Dehns conceived a child. 
The Dehns filed suit against Dr. Edgecombe in the Circuit 
Court for Prince George's County alleging negligence when Dr. 
Edgecombe failed to provide a referral for semen analysis, and they 
sought to recover the cost of raising the unwanted child. At the close 
of the Dehns' case, Dr. Edgecombe moved for judgment as a matter of 
law, which was granted for Mrs. Dehn's claim. The jury found that 
although Dr. Edgecombe was negligent by failing to provide adequate 
post-operative care, Mr. Dehn was contributory negligent in not 
abiding by Dr. Mazella's instructions. Judgment was entered on 
behalf of Dr. Edgecombe. The Dehns appealed and the Court of 
Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Mrs. Dehn's claims. The 
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Court of Appeals granted the Dehns' petition for writ of certiorari, 
which presented three questions. 
The first issue was whether the doctor-patient relationship 
gives rise to a duty owed by a doctor to a patient's spouse in negligent 
sterilization cases. /d. at 616, 865 A.2d at 609. If the Court agreed 
that the patient's spouse was entitled to a duty, the issue becomes 
whether the spouse's cause of action would be independent or 
derivative of the patient's. /d. The second question was whether the 
trial court properly ruled that evidence relating to Mr. Dehn's artery 
disease, other referrals from Dr. Edgecombe to Mr. Dehn, and Dr. 
Edgecombe's doubt about the paternity of the child was inadmissible. 
/d. The third question was whether the trial judge erred in ruling that 
nonpecuniary damages were not recoverable in this case. /d. 
The Court immediately addressed the first question by 
recounting the main arguments. /d. Relying on Jones v. Malinowski, 
the Dehns argued that because of the negligent sterilization, each 
parent suffered the damages of child rearing costs, thus, each parent 
should have an independent cause of action in negligence. /d. at 616-
17, 865 A.2d at 609 (citing Jones, 299 Md. 257, 270 (1984)). 
Alternatively, the Dehns argued that it was foreseeable that the 
doctor's negligent post-operative advice could have severe effects on 
the wife. /d. at 617, 865 A.2d at 609. Dr. Edgecombe contended that 
negligence actions require a duty of care, therefore, there must be a 
relationship between the parties, which was not established in this 
case. !d., 865 A.2d at 609-10. 
The Court initially examined the independent cause of action 
argument, concluding that medical malpractice and negligent 
sterilization cases follow traditional tort principles. /d. at 618-19, 865 
A.2d at 610. Focusing on the first element of negligence, the court 
concluded that without a legally recognized duty between Mrs. Dehn 
and Dr. Edgecombe, there could be no negligence action. /d. at 619, 
865 A.2d at 611. Considering the duty of care, the Court defined duty 
as an obligation to legally conform to a standard of conduct, which is 
generally established in malpractice cases with a doctor-patient 
relationship. /d. at 619-20, 865 A.2d at 611. The Court explained 
that the doctor-patient relationship is only confirmed when the 
physician takes action to treat the person, with several rare and limited 
exceptions. !d. 
The Court discussed the Court of Special Appeals opinions 
contemplating these exceptions, which occur in such circumstances as 
when the patient has a communicable disease that puts another person 
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at risk. /d. at 621, 865 A.2d at 611-12. The Court of Special Appeals, 
however, ruled that a patient's relatives do not have a cause of action 
when the doctor failed to disclose to them that the patient was HIV-
positive because there is an overriding policy of protecting the 
patient's privacy. /d. at 621, 865 A.2d at 612 (citing Lemon v. 
Stewart, 111 Md. App. 511,521,682 A.2d 1177,1181 (1996)). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that although extending a 
doctor's duty of care to a third party who never received treatment was 
not precluded under the common law, it would only happen under 
"extraordinary circumstances." /d. at 621, 865 A.2d at 612. This was 
not the case in Dehn. /d. at 622, 865 A.2d at 612. 
The Court further declared that because the issue of whether a 
spouse had an independent cause of action in a negligent sterilization 
case was not raised in Jones v. Malinowski, "for the purposes of our 
present analysis, the question remained open." /d. at 623-24, 865 A.2d 
at 613 (quoting Dehn v. Edgecombe, 152 Md. App. 657, 686,834 A.2d 
146, 162-63 (2003)) (Jones v. Malinowski, 229 Md. 257, 270, 473 
A.2d 429, 435 (1984) (holding that parents, as a single entity, could 
receive damages for child rearing costs for an unwanted child resulting 
from negligent sterilization)). 
With respect to the foreseeability argument, the Court 
dispensed with the Dehns' reasoning. Dehn, 384 Md. at 624-26, 865 
A.2d at 614. The Court affirmed that foreseeability, a factor when 
determining duty, should not be "confused with 'duty.'" /d. at 625, 
865 A.2d at 614 (quoting Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 
617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986)). Agreeing that a "special relationship" 
may be sufficient to impose a duty of care, the Court stated this was 
not such a case. Dehn, 384 Md. at 625, 865 A.2d at 614. The Court 
did not extend the duty of care, contending as a practical matter that 
imposing a legal duty upon Dr. Edgecombe would "expand traditional 
tort concepts beyond manageable bounds ... a possibility the law does 
not countenance." /d. at 627, 865 A.2d at 615. 
The second question posed to the Court was whether the trial 
court should have admitted evidence relating to Mr. Dehn's artery 
disease, other referrals from Dr. Edgecombe to Mr. Dehn, and Dr. 
Edgecombe's doubt regarding the paternity of the child. /d. at 616, 
865 A.2d at 609. Although Mr. Dehn argued this evidence was key to 
finding he was not contributory negligent, the Court examined the 
standard of review, concluding that evidentiary rulings are left to the 
discretion of the trial judge and will only be disturbed for an abuse of 
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discretion. !d. at 628, 865 A.2d at 616. The Court determined that 
there was no such abuse in this case. !d. 
The Court's final question-whether nonpecuniary damages 
were recoverable in this case-was not addressed because the jury's 
finding of contributory negligence precluded Mr. Dehn's recovery of 
damages. !d. at 630, 865 A.2d at 617. 
In Dehn v. Edgecombe, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that Maryland law does not acknowledge an independent medical 
malpractice cause of action for a patient's spouse when the spouse had 
no relationship or direct interaction with the doctor. This result may 
appear to be a harsh reality for those outside of the legal profession, 
but this decision was based on a concept taught to first year law 
students; negligence consists of duty, breach, causation, and damages. 
The Court strictly reaffirmed the duty element of negligence, 
preserving patient privacy, further limiting the individuals entitled to 
the doctor-patient relationship, and asserted that not everyone who is 
affected by negligence, even personally, has an independent cause of 
action. 
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